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Abstract
Wrong way risk (WWR) is a consideration for regulatory capital for
credit valuation adjustment (CVA). WWR is also of interest for pricing
and accounting and in these cases must include funding as well as ex-
posure and default in CVA and FVA calculation. Here we introduce a
model independent approach to WWR for regulatory CVA and also for
accounting CVA and FVA. This model independent approach is extremely
simple: we just re-write the CVA and FVA integral expressions in terms
of their components and then calibrate these components. This provides
transparency between component calibration and CVA/FVA effect be-
cause there is no model interpretation in between. Including funding in
WWR means that there are now two WWR terms rather than the usual
one. Using a regulatory inspired calibration from MAR50 we investigate
WWR effects for vanilla interest rate swaps and show that the WWR ef-
fects for FVA are significantly more material than for CVA. This model
independent approach can also be used to compare any WWR model by
simply calibrating to it for a portfolio and counterparty, to demonstrate
the effects of the model under investigation in terms of components of
CVA/FVA calculations.
1 Introduction
Wrong way risk (WWR) for regulatory credit valuation adjustment (CVA) is
part of the Standardized Approach for CVA (MAR50) and WWR is also im-
portant for pricing CVA including funding, and funding valuation adjustment
∗Contacts: chris.kenyon@mufgsecurities.com, mourad.berrahoui@lloydsbanking.com, ben-
jamin.poncet@lloydsbanking.com. This paper is a personal view and does not represent the
views of MUFG Securities EMEA plc (MUSE). This paper is not advice. Certain information
contained in this presentation has been obtained or derived from third party sources and such
information is believed to be correct and reliable but has not been independently verified.
Furthermore the information may not be current due to, among other things, changes in the
financial markets or economic environment. No obligation is accepted to update any such in-
formation contained in this presentation. MUSE shall not be liable in any manner whatsoever
for any consequences or loss (including but not limited to any direct, indirect or consequential
loss, loss of profits and damages) arising from any reliance on or usage of this presentation and
accepts no legal responsibility to any party who directly or indirectly receives this material.
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of any kind. Use at your own risk.
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(FVA). WWR describes the situation where exposure and default tend to in-
crease together. We focus on general WWR, i.e. where there is no direct (e.g.
legal) connection between default and exposure.
We present a model independent approach to both regulatory CVA where
there are two elements (exposure and default) and to accounting CVA and FVA
which have funding as a third element. Including exposure, default, and funding,
is market standard for pricing CVA and FVA. Our model independent approach
offers transparency between parameter estimation and CVA/FVA effect, and an
alternative to the more than thirty WWR models for CVA appearing since 2010
((Chung and Gregory 2019; Sakuma 2020) are two of the most recent), as well
as filling a gap in addressing WWR in accounting CVA and FVA.
Our model independent approach is simply to re-write analytic expressions
for CVA and FVA in terms of the two, or three, underlying elements and their
correlations. We continue re-writing in terms of simpler elements until they
can be estimated directly from market, simulation, or historical data. Once we
have re-written the expressions the independent and dependent (WWR) parts
of CVA and FVA are explicit, then we estimate the parameters within the re-
written equations. There is no model between these estimated parameters and
CVA/FVA, the parameters directly affect regulatory and accounting results so
the connection is transparent. We propose estimation that is inspired by recent
regulations (MGN20) and use it to provide numerical results.
2 Model Independent WWR
We develop WWR models by starting from an expression from CVA, or FVA,
derived elsewhere (Green 2016) or from MAR50 and simply rewrite it using
basic arithmetic to reveal the WWR structure. Once the WWR structure is
sufficiently simple that we can estimate (aka calibrate) the parameters we can
calculate the WWR impact on CVA and FVA.
The model independent approach offers transparency between parameter
calibration choices and their effects. We also obtain structural information
about the connection between counterparty portfolios and their WWR.
2.1 WWR for regulatory CVA
We first describe the regulatory CVA model, then re-write it in elementary
terms and provide a list of the properties revealed. Regulatory CVA is CVA
calculated in accordance with MAR50 (BCBS 2017) , i.e. excluding any effect of
own creditworthiness like funding effects. Parameters must be market-implied
where possible and historically calibrated otherwise.
2.1.1 Model
A standard expression for CVA meeting MAR50 requirements is (Green 2016):
CVA =
∫ T
0
EQ [LGD(t)λ(t)Dr,λ(t) max(0,Π(t))] dt (1)
Dr,λ(t) = exp(−(r(t) + λ(t))) (2)
Notation is given in Table 1.
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Symbol Meaning
Q Risk-neutral measure
r(t) riskless short rate at time t
rF (t) := r(t) + sF (t) funding short rate short rate at time t, equal to riskless
plus funding spread
λ(t) hazard rate for counterparty C at time t
LGD loss given default of counterparty C
Π, Π+ value of portfolio with counterparty, and exposure
Var(a) Variance of the distribution of the random variable a
SD(a) Standard Deviation of a
Table 1: Notation
term structure expression source
default-exposure correlation ρQt historical
default variance VarQt (LGDλDλ) historical
exposure variance VarQt (DrΠ
+) market implied, from CVA
simulation
Table 2: Parameter estimation for regulatory CVA WWR, for details see text.
Given two random variables a and b it is elementary that
E[ab] = E[a]E[b] + ρa,bSD(a)SD(b) (3)
Applying this to Equation 1 with a = LGD(t)λ(t)Dλ(t) and b = Dr(t) max(0,Π(t))
and using Π+ = max(0,Π(t)) we get:
CVA =
∫ T
0
EQt [LGDλDλ]E
Q
t [DrΠ
+]dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA, no WWR
+
∫ T
0
ρQt
√
VarQt (LGDλDλ)Var
Q
t (DrΠ
+)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA WWR only
(4)
For stochastic processes ρt is the term structure of terminal correlation (not the
instantaneous correlation) see (Rebonato 2005) Section 5.3. Regulatory WWR
for CVA is summarized in Table 2.
An objection at this point might be that we have done nothing but re-write
Equation 1. This is exactly the simplicity of the model independent approach,
we express WWR directly in terms that are applicable to CVA. It is easy to
understand the meaning of ρQt : correlation between forward default probabilities
and forward exposures.
2.1.2 Parameter Estimation
There are three items to estimate: exposure; default; and the terminal corre-
lation between them, summarized in Table 2. Regulations state that market-
implied estimation must be used where available, and if not available then his-
torical estimation is permitted.
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• Dynamics of underlyings for discounting and exposure: this is done as
usual, with no change to standard (no-WWR) CVA setup. Note that
if there are any credit-dependent derivatives in the exposure then their
dynamics are unchanged and exposure calculated as usual.
• Dynamics of counterparty default probability and loss given default: his-
torical estimation. Counterparty portfolios can go out 20 or 30 years but
there are no liquid options on CDS to calibrate to so this must be histor-
ical. Whilst there are some options on index CDS their maximum liquid
maturity is generally less than one year so are not useful for CVA.
Hazard rates calibrated from CDS spreads are quite insensitive to dis-
counting and this justifies the separation of hazard and (relatively fixed
CDS) here exposure (Brigo and Mercurio 2007) here.
• Term structure of default-exposure terminal correlation: this is estimated
historically (see Numerical examples section for details) using a constant
(current) portfolio against historical market data. If there were standard
traded CVA contracts, e.g. CCDS, for each counterparty then this could
be market implied, but there are none.
2.1.3 Properties
• Equation 4 is exact: this is trivially true as it is simply an elementary re-
writing of CVA. No assumptions are required on exposure, underlyings,
default, or correlation beyond the existence of second moments.
• The terminal correlation term structure is deterministic. ρQt is not stochas-
tic.
• The terminal correlation term structure is counterparty specific.
• The re-writing cleanly separates the items that can be market implied
(the expectations and exposure variances) from those that need historical
estimation (terminal correlation and default variance).
• The re-write demonstrates that WWR (or RWR) is a basic, first order,
property of CVA in the same way that E[ab] = E[a]E[b] +ρa,bSD(a)SD(b).
2.2 WWR for pricing and accounting CVA and FVA
Pricing CVA and FVA usually include funding spreads and costs, thus there
are three elements to consider: exposure; default; and funding, not two as in
Regulatory CVA. It is not surprising that there will now be two WWR terms
rather than one. We apply the same re-writing approach starting from CVA
and FVA formulae analogous to the regulatory case:
CVA =
∫ T
0
EQ
[
LGD(t)λ(t)DrF ,λ(t)Π
+(t)
]
dt (5)
FVA =
∫ T
0
EQ [sF (t)DrF ,λ(t)Π(t)] dt (6)
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Given three random variables {a, b, c} we can re-write the expectation of their
product:
E[abc] =E[a]E[bc] + ρa,bcSD(a)SD(bc) (7)
=E[a]E[b]E[c] + E[a]ρb,cSD(b)SD(c) + ρa,bcSD(a)SD(bc) (8)
=E[a]E[b]E[c] + E[b]ρa,cSD(a)SD(c) + ρb,acSD(b)SD(ac) (9)
=E[a]E[b]E[c] + E[c]ρa,bSD(a)SD(b) + ρc,abSD(a)SD(ab) (10)
and taking SD(ab) for example we can re-write it so as to separate functions of
a from functions of b:
Var(ab) =ρa2,b2SD(a
2)SD(b2) + E[a2]E[b2]
− (ρa,bSD(a)SD(b) + E[a]E[b])2 (11)
There are now three equivalent expressions for CVA and FVA depending on
which re-write equation, 8, 9, or 10 we pick. Note that by using Equation
11 we achieve a clean separation between market-implied items (expectations
and exposure variances) and historically calibrated items (terminal correlations,
default variances, and funding variances).
CVA =
∫ T
0
EQt [LGDλDλ]E
Q
t [DsF ]E
Q
t [DrΠ
+]dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA, no WWR
+
∫ T
0
ρc1t E
Q
t [LGDλDλ]
√
VarQt (DsF )Var
Q
t (DrΠ
+)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA WWR funding-exposure
(12)
+
∫ T
0
ρc2t
√
VarQt (LGDλDλ)Var
Q
t (DsFDrΠ
+)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
CVA WWR default-funding+exposure
FVA =
∫ T
0
EQt [Dλ]E
Q
t [sFDsF ]E
Q
t [DrΠ]dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVA, no WWR
+
∫ T
0
ρf1t E
Q
t [Dλ]
√
VarQt (sFDsF )Var
Q
t (DrΠ
)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVA WWR funding-exposure
(13)
+
∫ T
0
ρf2t
√
VarQt (Dλ)Var
Q
t (sFDsFDrΠ
)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
FVA WWR default-funding+exposure
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where
Vart(DsF (DrΠ
+)) =ρc2.1t SD(D
2
sF )SD((DrΠ
+)2) + E[D2sF ]E[(DrΠ
+)2]
− (ρc1t SD(DsF )SD(DrΠ+) + E[DsF ]E[DrΠ+])2 (14)
Vart((sFDsF )(DrΠ)) =ρ
f2.1
t SD((sFDsF )
2)SD((DrΠ)
2) + E[(sFDsF )2]E[(DrΠ)2]
−
(
ρf1t SD(sFDsF )SD(DrΠ) + E[sFDsF ]E[DrΠ]
)2
(15)
We have suppressed most of the time indices for clarity. Note that each term
within an expectation or variance operator becomes a deterministic term struc-
ture after the expectation or variance is take.
The terminal correlation term structures used for pricing/accounting CVA
are:
• ρc1t : DsF versus DrΠ+
• ρc2t : LGDλDλ versus DsFDrΠ+
• ρc2.1t : D2sF versus (DrΠ+)2
These are counterparty specific.
The terminal correlation term structures used for pricing/accounting FVA
are:
• ρf1t : sFDsF versus DrΠ
• ρf2t : Dλ versus sFDsFDrΠ
• ρf2.1t : (sFDsF )2 versus (DrΠ)2
These are counterparty specific.
Note that ρc1t may be quite close to ρ
c2.1
t when DsF is always non-negative.
Similarly for ρf1t and ρ
f2.1
t . This is a property of “reasonably behaved” random
variables with positive support, which can be verified empirically.
Note that the variances we require after using Equation 16 either involve
credit, funding spread, or exposure. We have arranged that no variances involv-
ing cross terms are required so these term structures of terminal volatility can
be estimated independently:
{VarQt (DsF ), VarQt (DrΠ+), VarQt (DrΠ), VarQt (LGDλDλ), VarQt (sFDsF ),
VarQt (Dλ), Var
Q
t (D
2
sF ), Var
Q
t (DrΠ
+)2, VarQt (DrΠ)
2, VarQt (sFDsF )
2}
(16)
2.2.1 Parameter Estimation
This follows the same pattern as for regulatory CVA. Expectations are market-
implied as are exposure variances. Default variances, funding variances and
term structures of terminal correlation are historically calibrated.
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2.2.2 Properties
• Equations 12 and 13 for CVA and FVA respectively, are exact: this is
a trivial property since we are only re-writing the original equations 5
and 6. No assumptions are required on exposure underlyings, default, or
correlation beyond the existence of second moment for underlyings and
squares of underlyings.
• There are three term structures of terminal correlation that determine the
price of WWR for CVA, and another three for WWR of FVA.
• The terminal correlation term structures are deterministic.
• The model cleanly separates the items that may be market implied (the
expectations and exposure variances) from those that need historical es-
timation (terminal correlations and variances of default and funding) as
before.
• Having two WWR terms for accounting CVA and FVA is a first order
property that is simply the result of having three underlyings: exposure;
default; and funding.
In the following numerical examples we will show in detail the historical
estimation of variances and correlations.
3 Numerical examples
We first describe the setup, then calibration, and then numerical results. The
setup is an example and its elements are not prescriptive, for example funding
costs might be idiosyncratic, or derived from Totem.
3.1 Setup
We consider WWR for the experimental setup of a bank trading with an uncol-
laterlized counterparty as follows
asof 2019-11-01
trades vanilla EUR interest rate swaps with maturities of 5, 10, 20, and 30
years. Receive float and receive fixed.
counterparty CDS Eur iTraxx crossover
bank funding spread Eur iTraxx Senior Financials
correlation calibration period 2008 – 2012, for all correlations
counterparty CDS volatility calibration period one year up to asof date
swaption volatiliy ATM Normal volatilities for both historical period and
valuation date.
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Asof is a recent date. The trades maturities cover a normal range of lengths
for counterparty IRS trades. The counterparty CDS spread is a choice that
represents counterparties that may have significant CVA and so are of interest
for WWR. We use Eur iTraxx Senior Financials to represent the funding spread
over riskless for the bank as an observable and related spread. The correlation
calibration period is inspired by MAR50 in that it covers five years and includes
a period of stress for interest rate trades. There are no liquid single name CDS
options, and liquid index CDS options have maximum expiry of 9 months, so
we use historical calibration for CDS volatility, picking a recent period, i.e. last
one year.
Since we are working with vanilla IRS we have no need of simulation model
for CVA and FVA, we simply use the sum-of-risky-swaptions approach. On
the valuation date we do need the volatilities of the exposure levels and use
the Normal distribution from the market data to obtain this. We use low-
discrepancy integration for the exposure and similar volatilities for efficiency,
but there is effectively no numerical noise.
3.2 Calibration
An outline of the correlation calibration process is shown in Figure 1. In the
figure the objective is to get the correlation between the default probability
(PD) between τ to τ + dt and the corresponding positive expected exposure
(EE). Working backwards from the single lower plot of PD against EE for τ to
τ +dt we see that the points used to calculate the correlation of PD vs EE come
from different dates. On each of the three dates shown we compute the EE and
PD against time (aka portfolio maturity). For PD against EE for τ to τ +dt we
take one value from the EE graph on each date on on value from the PD graph.
We repeat the process in Figure 1 for every forward maturity τ over the
life of the portfolio with the counterparty (“Time” in the Figure). This set
of correlations versus Time provides the correlation term structure that goes
into the WWR calculation. A similar method is used for every correlation term
structure.
Some details are important. The portfolio is kept constant as it is evaluated
against the different market data from different dates. This is similar to how
VaR is calculated. Default probabilities are calculated asof their market data
dates because CDS maturities are standardized on IMM dates. Fixings are
taken from the valuation date and inserted into the historical market data files.
The term structure of default probability volatility, including LGD changes,
is calculated in a similar way to the correlation term structure except that the
most recent one year period is used, as it would be for pricing.
3.3 Results
We show a sample of the input data as well as all the WWR numbers for the
trades considered. Figure 2 shows the history of EUR 6m fixings and {5y, 10y,
30y} swap rates together with Eur iTraxx Xover and Eur Senior Financials.
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Time	
EE	
Time	
PD	
EE(d1,τ,dt)	
PD(d1,τ,dt)	
Date	d1	 Time	
EE	
Time	
PD	
EE(d2,τ,dt)	
PD(d2,τ,dt)	
Date	d2	 Time	
EE	
Time	
PD	
EE(d3,τ,dt)	
PD(d3,τ,dt)	
Date	d3	
PD(τ,dt)	
EE(τ,dt)	
ρ(τ,dt)
X		Date	1	
X		Date3	
X		Date	2	
Figure 1: Outline of correlation calibration process. For details see text.
3.3.1 Regulatory CVA
Figure 3 shows the exposure-default correlation term structure for 30Y ATM
receive float IRS in the Top Left plot. The wave-like shape is superficially
unexpected but can be understood from the plot of forward 6m default proba-
bilities (Top Right). Observe that when the CDS spreads increase in 2009 the
1y forward default probability increases significantly, but the 9.5y forward de-
fault probability decreases. Since the area under the forward default probability
curve must integrate to unity, an increase in one region must be balanced by a
decrease in another region.
We can compute the crossover tenor between increase and decrease of default
probabilities by equating the instantaneous forward default probabilities:
λ1e
−λ1t =λ2e−λ2t
crossover point t =
log(λ1/λ2)
λ1 − λ2 (17)
Suppose we have a flat CDS curve and we increase it by 500bps, which is similar
to the smallest increase for the iTraxx Xover during the crisis, this then gives
the brown curve on the Bottom Right of Figure 3.
The second crossover tenor in the correlation term structure is also due to
curve movements over 2008–2012. Consider the interest rates as though they
were CDS, simply because an IRS pays a discounted rate which has a similar
form to the instantaneous default probability λ exp(−tλ). We can then apply
the same logic as above using the blue curve in Bottom Right plot of Figure 3
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Figure 2: Jan 2008 – Dec 2012 market data for correlation calibration. LHS
interest rates. RHS CDS spreads: iTraxx crossover are in colour; Senior Finan-
cials are in black.
considering the decrease in EUR rates from around 4.5% to around 1.5% over
the period. This gives a predicted crossover around 20y which is similar to that
observed in both receive float IRS (Top Left) and receive fixed IRS (Bottom
Left). For the receive fixed IRS the interest rate move dominates the credit
move so there is no early crossover in the exposure-default correlation term
structure.
Shorter IRS, and IRS with different strikes have similar patterns to the
correlation term structures shown, but truncated in the case of shorter IRS.
Table 3 shows independent accounting CVA and the regulatory WW com-
ponent in bps of notional for a range of tenors and strikes. We see that WWR
for receive-float IRS (uncommon case) can be up to 25% of independent CVA
but is typically a few percent. For receive-fixed IRS (usual case with clients)
the WWR is also a few percent. In both cases crisis levels of CDS volatility
reduce WWR CVA.
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Figure 3: Top Left: regulatory CVA exposure-default correlation term struc-
ture for 30Y receive float IRS, different curves are different strikes (-25bps
and 2%). Top Right: iTraxx Xover 6m forward default probabilities. Bot-
tom Left: regulatory CVA exposure-default correlation term structure for 30Y
receive fix IRS, different curves are different strikes (-25bps and 2%). Bottom
Right: crossover tenors for 500bps (brown) and 300bps (blue) changes in CDS
or IRS levels. Arrows indicate predicted crossovers for receive IRS: compare
with Top Left. For receive fixed IRS (Bottom Left) the rates move dominates
the credit move.
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T K CVA Indep WW WW+Crisis T K CVA Indep WW WW+Crisis
years percent RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt years percent RecFix RecFix RecFix
5 -0.25 5 -0.1 0. 5 -0.25 3 -0.5 0.
5 0 2 -0.1 0. 5 0 8 -0.7 0.
5 0.5 0 0. 0. 5 0.5 19 -0.9 0.
5 1. 0 0. 0. 5 1. 33 -1. 0.
5 2. 0 0. 0. 5 2. 60 -1. 0.
10 -0.25 80 -2.7 -0.2 10 -0.25 18 -3.1 -0.2
10 0 58 -2.4 -0.2 10 0 27 -3.9 -0.2
10 0.5 30 -1.9 -0.2 10 0.5 61 -5.4 -0.3
10 1. 14 -1.3 -0.1 10 1. 106 -6.6 -0.3
10 2. 2 -0.5 -0.1 10 2. 218 -7.6 -0.4
20 -0.25 480 -10.4 8.2 20 -0.25 77 -9.1 -8.
20 0 397 -9.7 7.6 20 0 103 -11.3 -9.4
20 0.5 256 -8.1 6.2 20 0.5 182 -16.1 -12.3
20 1. 160 -6.3 5. 20 1. 305 -20.7 -15.
20 2. 55 -3. 2.9 20 2. 639 -26.5 -19.3
30 -0.25 908 -12.1 28.6 30 -0.25 193 -13.5 2.5
30 0 756 -11.5 28.8 30 0 249 -17.3 -3.8
30 0.5 497 -9.7 26.9 30 0.5 406 -25.6 -17.8
30 1. 317 -7.3 23.4 30 1. 641 -33.4 -32.
30 2. 117 -3.1 15. 30 2. 1272 -42.9 -56.9
Table 3: Regulatory CVA for Receive-Floating (RecFlt) and Receive-Fixed (RecFix) vanilla EUR IRS for a range of tenors
(T) and strikes (K). We show WWR for CVA under current conditions (CVA+WW) and under conditions with increased
CDS volatility taken from 2008 as WW+Crisis. Note that strikes are absolute (not relative to ATM). Units are bps of
notional.
3.3.2 Accounting CVA and FVA
We now include funding, modeled using the iTraxx Senior Financials CDS index
points shown in black in Figure 2 RHS.
Figure 4 shows the correlation term structures for accounting CVA {c1,c2,c2.1}
and FVA {f1,f2,f2.1} for receive float IRS and receive fix IRS. Overall the cor-
relation patterns are a combination of the previous regulatory case, and a new
behavior when there are no changes of sign of the correlation term structures.
These behaviors are a reflection of the more complex nature of the WWR terms
and that FVA is not option-like (uses net exposure), unlike CVA (positive ex-
posure only).
Table 4 gives the CVA and FVA details for the range of vanilla EUR receive
float IRS. Table 4 provides the details for receive fixed IRS.
We can first note that the second WWR term for both CVA and FVA is
negligible. This second WWR term is a mixture of all three factors mixed in
different ways by the variance terms so, net, there is no directional contribution.
It is possible that this observation will also hold for other instruments.
In absolute terms, and compared to the regulatory view, accounting CVA
WWR is small for receive fixed IRS, mostly below or of the order of a couple of
percent. In contrast accounting CVA WWR for receive float IRS can be above
10% although it is also generally below a couple of percent.
FVA WWR is significant as it is often more than ten percent and can reach
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Figure 4: Top Left: accounting CVA {c1,c2,c2.1} correlations for 30y receive
fix IRS. Top Right: receive float IRS. Bottom Left: FVA {f1,f2,f2.1} correlations
for receive fix IRS. Bottom Right: receive float IRS. Blue and Green curves are
*1 and *2.1 correlations, these have the same underlyings but squared in the
second case. *2 are the yellow curves.
more than fifty percent in some cases. The greater magnitude of FVA WWR
compared to accounting CVA WWR is mostly because it is not option-like so
has simpler correlation behavior in general.
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T K CVA Indep WW1 WW2 FVA Indep WW1 WW2 CVA FVA
years percent RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt RecFlt
5 -0.25 5 0 0 1 0 0 5 0.8
5 0 2 0 0 -3 0 0 2 -2
5 0.5 0 0.1 -0.0001 -9 1 0 0 -7.5
5 1 0 0.1 -0.0002 -15 2 0 0 -12.7
5 2 0 0.2 -0.0003 -27 4 0 0 -23
10 -0.25 73 0.1 -0.0002 25 1 -0.0001 73 26
10 0 55 0.2 -0.0002 12 2 -0.0001 55 14
10 0.5 28 0.4 -0.0003 -13 4 -0.0001 29 -9.4
10 1 13 0.7 -0.0006 -38 6 -0.0001 14 -32.1
10 2 2 1.4 -0.0013 -89 13 -0.0001 3 -75.7
20 -0.25 425 1.1 -0.0004 166 4 0.0003 426 170
20 0 352 1.4 -0.0004 121 5 0.0003 354 126
20 0.5 230 2.4 -0.0005 30 9 0.0003 232 39.6
20 1 142 3.7 -0.0007 -60 16 0.0003 146 -44.5
20 2 48 7.2 -0.0019 -241 35 0.0003 55 -206
30 -0.25 783 1.1 -0.0004 291 8 0.002 784 298.9
30 0 652 1.9 -0.0004 206 11 0.002 654 217.2
30 0.5 430 4 -0.0005 37 19 0.002 434 56.2
30 1 270 6.9 -0.0007 -131 31 0.0019 277 -100.5
30 2 96 14.6 -0.0018 -469 68 0.0019 111 -401.3
Table 4: Accounting CVA and FVA for Receive-Floating (RecFlt) vanilla EUR IRS for a range of tenors (T) and strikes
(K). Note that strikes are absolute (not relative to ATM). Units are bps of notional. Last two columns are total CVA and
FVA. WW1 and WW2 are the first and second WWR terms in Equations 12 and 13.
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T K CVA Indep WW1 WW2 FVA Indep WW1 WW2 CVA FVA
years percent RecFix RecFix RecFix RecFix RecFix RecFix RecFix RecFix
5 -0.25 3 0 -0.0001 -1 0 0 3 -0.4
5 0 7 0 -0.0001 3 0 0 7 2.3
5 0.5 16 0 -0.0003 9 -1 0 16 7.7
5 1 27 -0.1 -0.0005 15 -2 0 27 13.1
5 2 51 -0.1 -0.0009 27 -3 0 50 23.8
10 -0.25 17 0.2 -0.0006 -25 3 -0.0001 17 -21.7
10 0 26 0.1 -0.0004 -12 2 -0.0001 26 -10.6
10 0.5 54 -0.1 -0.0007 13 -2 -0.0001 54 11.4
10 1 94 -0.3 -0.0015 38 -5 -0.0001 94 33.4
10 2 193 -0.8 -0.0029 89 -12 -0.0001 192 77.1
20 -0.25 68 2.1 -0.0025 -166 18 -0.001 70 -147.8
20 0 92 1.6 -0.0018 -121 14 -0.0011 94 -107.2
20 0.5 164 0.5 -0.0009 -30 4 -0.0012 164 -26.6
20 1 269 -0.5 -0.002 60 -7 -0.0012 269 53.1
20 2 562 -2.3 -0.0055 241 -31 -0.0012 560 210.9
30 -0.25 162 4.4 -0.0033 -291 32 -0.0004 167 -259.1
30 0 211 3.1 -0.0024 -206 23 -0.0007 214 -183.2
30 0.5 349 0.6 -0.001 -37 5 -0.0011 350 -32.8
30 1 549 -1.8 -0.0025 131 -16 -0.0014 547 115.8
30 2 1094 -5.5 -0.0074 469 -59 -0.0018 1088 409.5
Table 5: Accounting CVA and FVA for Receive-Fixed (RecFix) vanilla EUR IRS for a range of tenors (T) and strikes (K).
Note that strikes are absolute (not relative to ATM). Units are bps of notional. Last two columns are total CVA and FVA.
WW1 and WW2 are the first and second WWR terms in Equations 12 and 13.
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4 Conclusions
The model independent WWR approach presented here is unique because it
literally requires no modeling, but is simply a re-writing of the expressions for
regulatory CVA and accounting CVA and FVA. Because the approach is model
independent any calibration is directly in terms of the parameters for CVA and
FVA calculation themselves and so provides maximum transparency.
WWR depends on correlations of factors and here we use the elements in the
CVA and FVA calculations themselves: default; exposure; funding. Correlation
calibration is usually historical and this is what we do here. We have picked
a historical period inspired by the MAR50 regulation in that it encompasses a
stressed year (around the end of 2008) and is a total of five years.
XVA usually incorporates funding costs which are not part of regulations,
but funding costs are of immediate interest to accounting (aka pricing). We
were able to extend the model independent approach naturally to include the
third factor (funding) with the same degree of transparency as for regulatory
CVA. The increase in complexity, three correlations rather than one and two
WWR terms rather than one, is also expected given we now have three factors
rather than two. However, our results indicate that the second WWR term may
be negligible thus reducing complexity.
We observe that structural shifts during the calibration period (2008-2012)
are reflected in the correlation term structures, notably in the sign changes
of correlations. The effect on CVA and FVA is a complex interplay between
the portfolio (IRS here), credit and funding. Because our CVA and FVA in-
puts are directly in terms of CVA and FVA we can both observe and numeri-
cally/analytically explain these effects (see Figure 3 and Equation 17).
Our results suggest that WWR in CVA strongly depends on the instrument,
but may generally be low, i.e. of the order of a couple of percent. In contrast,
WWR in FVA is significant for IRS, i.e. 10% to more than 50% and these results
too may hold for other instruments.
Technically we have shown how to deal with two and three factors in WWR.
This generalizes to any number of factors which can then be assessed, as here
with WW2, for materiality.
Finally, our model independent approach can be used forensically to compare
different WWR models on the same terms. Models for comparison can simply
be simulated and then use as calibration for this model independent approach.
In this way any WWR model that can produce simulated paths of exposure,
default and funding can be directly compared in terms of parameters directly
relevant for CVA and FVA. Just as different WWR models can be compared,
so can different calibration assumptions for this model independent approach
itself and other WWR models.
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